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
## RESEARCH REPORT

WHAT AIR DEFENSE SHOULD JAPAN HAVE TO MEET  
THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET FORCES AROUND JAPAN?

COLONEL TOSHIMI ENOKI, JASDF

1989

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WHAT AIR DEFENSE SHOULD JAPAN HAVE TO MEET THE EXPANSION  
OF SOVIET FORCES AROUND JAPAN?

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Dr. David E. Albright

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

MAY 1989

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**TITLE:** What Air Defense Should Japan Have to Meet the Expansion of Soviet Forces Around Japan?

**AUTHOR:** Toshimi Enoki, Colonel, JASDF

The continued Soviet military build-up over the past two decades has created a very unstable situation in the Asian and Pacific region. The Soviet Union strives to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a sanctuary by improving its military power in the Far East and redeploying its ground and air forces onto the Northern Islands.

Japan should improve its air defense system to defend its own airspace, especially the development of anti-cruise missile capability, and should develop the naval and air capacity to protect its sea lanes of communication in conjunction with U.S. forces in the region. Japan should also continue the already announced steady and gradual expansion of the Japanese air self-defense forces, with an emphasis on quality rather than quantity.



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## Biographical Sketch

Colonel Toshimi Enoki (Japan Air Self Defense Force) has been interested in Soviet military expansion around Japan since he was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo in 1981-1983, where he was in charge of Asian regional security. Then, He reported to the Japanese Air Staff office in Tokyo and worked there for two years in the personnel Division and another two years in Maintenance Division. He graduated from the Japanese National Defense Academy in 1969, the Japanese Air Command and Staff course in 1980. Colonel Enoki is a graduate of the Air War College class of 1989.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union has considered a military buildup as one of its top priorities. As a result, it has developed sufficient power to confront the United States or Japan in the sphere of both nuclear and conventional forces.

The current expansion of the Soviet military presence in the Asia and Pacific region has a critical effect on Japan. Soviet military improvements include increases in both the quality and quantity of Soviet forces in the Far East; efforts to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a Soviet sanctuary; the construction and reinforcement of military bases in Vietnam and Laos; and active maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean.

The Soviet Union continued to expand its military strength even during the period of so-called "detente" in the 1970's, when the United States restrained its defense efforts. As a result, the cumulative effect of the Soviet military buildup has become particularly conspicuous in recent years.

In order to maintain peace and security for Japan, it is vital to deepen mutual understanding and to build up friendly and cooperative relations with various countries through interchanges in a wide range of fields. Furthermore, development of the economy and stabilization of the internal political situation constitute the base



of national security. However, efforts in these directions are, in themselves, not enough to prevent aggression by force and to repel invaders when aggression actually takes place.

In viewing military power, we should not think only of the case in which it is actually exercised. It is essential to think of the functions which military power is performing even without its being executed. Each independent nation should possess military strength commensurate with its respective position in the international environment in order not to create a so-called power vacuum region. By doing so, each nation will be able to contribute to regional stability and international peace.

The Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), which is comprised of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF), the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF), must take various kinds of steps to enable Japan to cope with the continuing Soviet military expansion. To lay the foundation for discussion of these steps, I will first analyze the Soviet Union's ongoing military build-up, both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions in East Asia in Chapter II. In the Chapter III, I will look at the considerations governing

what Japan does militarily to respond to the Soviet military expansion - Constitutional constraints, budgetary factors, the U.S.-Japan relationship etc. Then in Chapter IV, I will be explicit what Japan can do, what it cannot do, and what it must do against the increased threat. I will also state in this chapter what specific role the Japan Air Self Defense Force would play and what the difficulties are there.

Finally, in Chapter V, I will suggest several measures to be adopted by Japan herself and the Japan Air Self Defense force and explain the reasons why we should adopt them.

## II. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP

### A. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union has considered a military buildup as one of its most important priorities. At present, it has increased its power sufficiently to confront even the United States in the spheres of both nuclear and conventional forces.

Ralph H. Clough, a consultant on East Asian Affairs, testified before Congress in 1985 that "the Soviet Union has three principal objectives in Northeast Asia: the first, to insure the Security of Soviet territory; Second, to project Soviet power and influence; and finally, to develop economically Siberia and the Far East."<sup>1</sup> In order to achieve these objectives, the Soviet Union has dramatically increased its military forces in the region.

Therefore, this chapter will analyze the role of military power in Soviet thinking; the current Soviet military buildup; the military buildup in the Asia-Pacific Region; and the background of Soviet expansion.

### B. THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER IN SOVIET THINKING

The role of military power in Soviet eyes can best be comprehended by understanding the state's full commitment to developing, supporting, and sustaining armed forces for internal, regional, and global use.<sup>2</sup> The functions

of military power are presented in Soviet writings in this context.

According to David Holloway, the main function of military power from the Soviet standpoint is to prevent a world war by deterring a nuclear attack through the threat of certain retaliation. The second is to defend the socialist community and its individual member states. The third is to aid national liberation movements and newly independent states to resist the forces of imperialism. The growth of Soviet military power seems to contribute to all these purposes by weakening the ability of the imperialist states to use their military power to stop the movement of the correlation of forces toward socialism.<sup>3</sup>

#### C. THE CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP

U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci has summarized the Soviet military buildup in his report, Soviet Military Power, 1988. This observes:

This year's Soviet Military Power also draws attention to some of the noteworthy developments in Soviet military strength observed since the publication of Soviet Military Power 1987, among them:

- \*The Soviets' longstanding extensive program to build deep underground facilities for leadership protection during nuclear war is discussed in detail for the first time in this year's edition.
- \*The SS-24 rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) began its initial deployment;

- The SL-16 medium-lift space-launch vehicle became operational;
- The first launch of the SL-X-17 heavy-lift space-launch vehicle was observed;
- The SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missile became operational;
- A fourth KIEV-Class aircraft carrier became operational;
- A third AKULA-Class nuclear-powered attack submarine was launched; and
- The I1-76/MAINSTAY airborne warning and control system aircraft became operational.

These are merely the most recent manifestations of a continuing buildup of Soviet nuclear and conventional force capabilities. Since 1981, virtually every component of Soviet military power has been expanded and modernized:

- Soviet strategic nuclear offensive forces continue to be upgraded. The decade began with the completion of fourth-generation ICBM development - the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19. In 1985, the Soviets led off the introduction of a fifth generation of ICBMs with the road mobile SS-25.
- The TYPHOON ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) carrying 10 SS-N-20 missiles was introduced, followed closely by the DELTA IV SSBN carrying the SS-N-23 missile.
- The BEAR H bomber, armed with the AS-15 long-range, nuclear-armed cruise missile, was introduced, and deployment of the new strategic bomber, the BLACKJACK, is about to begin.
- The Soviets continue modernizing their ballistic missile defense system around Moscow by converting it into a two-layer defense composed of silo-based, long-range, modified GALOSH interceptors; silo-based GAZELLE high-acceleration endoatmospheric interceptors; and associated engagement, guidance, and battle management radar systems, including the new PILL BOX large phased-array radar at Pushkino.
- The across-the-board modernization of Soviet conventional forces in the 1980s, including tanks, artillery, fighter aircraft, and surface and submarine combatants, constitutes

a major improvement in Soviet military capabilities. The T-80 tank, BTR-80 armored personnel carrier, SPAA-M-1986 air defense gun, SA-12 surface-to-air missile, and SS-23 short-range ballistic missile have all become operational since 1981.

\*The Su-25/FROGFOOT and the state-of-the-art Su27/FLANKER, MiG-29/FULCRUM, the MiG-31/FOXHOUND aircraft are now all operational and widely deployed.

\*In the Soviet Navy, a 65,000-ton aircraft carrier designed for ramp-assisted aircraft launch is under construction. Additionally, four new surface warship classes, two attack submarine classes, three new naval aircraft types, six new naval surface weapon systems, and six new general purpose submarine classes have been put to sea by the Soviets since 1981.<sup>4</sup>

#### D. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The Soviet military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region is in essence part of a world wide, relentless process transforming the Soviet Union into a truly global power. Paul F. Langer of the Rand Corporation points out present Soviet perspectives on Asia through an analysis of Soviet statements and behavior:

If Soviet Military priorities have not been basically altered by the events of the past decade and if the focus of Soviet security concerns remains as before on Europe, Soviet statements and behavior do suggest two important conclusions regarding present Soviet perspectives on Asia. We find: an enhanced capacity and readiness on the part of the Soviet Union to exploit opportunities in--and intervene militarily into--the turbulent Asian arena; and growing Soviet concern about a regional security threat that centers on China and its

developing ties with the United States and Japan as the focus.<sup>5</sup>


Over the past two decades, the Soviet Union has made maximum efforts to improve, increase and modernize its ground, air, and naval forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, where it has put priority. Defense of Japan, 1987 focused on the Soviet Far Eastern Forces buildup. It stated:

Since the middle of the 1960s, the Soviet Union has made every effort to modernize all armed forces deployed in the Far East. Today, the Soviet Union deploys a quarter to a third of its military forces in the regions, and continues to build them up, both in quality and quantity. In spite of Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's speed at Vladivostok. There are no changes in the tendency of a Soviet military buildup.

As for strategic nuclear forces, a quarter to a third of the entire Soviet ICBM and SLBM strategic missile force appears to have been deployed in the Far East. ICBMs and strategic bombers are deployed along the Siberian railway, and nuclear-powered submarines like the Delta III-class SSBN carrying SLBMs are deployed in waters centering on the Sea of Okhotsk and related sea areas. The ICBMs and SLBMs are going to modernize as SS-18 and SS-N-18. Furthermore, modernized TU-95 H bombers, which are believed to carry AS-15 air-launched cruise missiles, have been deployed in the Far East region. Soviet intermediate-range nuclear arms have been rapidly reinforced in recent years (See Diagram 1).<sup>6</sup>

To be sure, SS-20 missiles still in Asia are supposed to be withdrawn in accordance with the INF treaty of 8 December 1987;<sup>7</sup> however,

**Diagram 1**      **Changes in Soviet Far Eastern Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces**



Source: Defence of Japan, 1987



At present about 170 SS-20 missiles and about 85 TU-22M Backfire bombers are still deployed.


SS-20 missiles are deployed in Central Siberia and around Lake Baikal. Backfire bombers which have an approximately 4,000 Km combat radius and are capable of carrying AS-4 air-to-surface missiles are deployed west of Lake Baikal and in the coastal region of Sakhalin. The ground forces are equipped with such nuclear and non-nuclear tactical missiles as Frog, SS-1 Scud and SS-12. The SS-12s are being replaced by new SS-22s.

The ground forces have been increased steadily since 1965 (See Diagram 2). About 500,000 troops formed into 57 divisions out of the entire Soviet ground force strength of 2 million troops in 211 divisions are at present deployed, mainly in the Sino-Soviet border region, of which about 390,000 troops of 43 divisions are assigned to the Far East (roughly east of Lake Baikal).

The ground forces are improving not only in quantity but also quality such as T-72 tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, surface-to-surface (Air) missiles, and other equipment. These improvements have contributed not only to firepower maneuverability, protective power and battlefield air defense capability but also to chemical warfare capability.


The Soviet Air Force has about 8,840 combat aircraft in total and deploys about 2,390 of them or a quarter of the total in the Far East. These comprise about 460 bombers, 1,630 fighters and about 200 patrol planes (See Diagram 3). Replacement of old models with new, high performance aircraft such as the TU-22M Backfire has been notable in recent years. Today, about 80 percent of the fighters are third-generation types, such as MiG-23/27 Floggers and SU-24 Fencers. In addition, the Soviet Union has started deploying the MiG-31 Foxhound and the SU-25 Frogfoot and SU-27 Flanker new fighter to continue its military modernization (See Diagram 4). With these reinforcements of the new type aircraft, the Soviet Far Eastern forces have now obtained more anti-surface capability to attack ground/naval ships and have acquired more capability for air superiority than before.

**Diagram 2    Changes in Number of Soviet Far Eastern Divisions**




Source: Defence of Japan, 1987

**Diagram 3    Changes In Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces**




Source: Defence of Japan, 1987

**Diagram 4 Changes in Modernization of Soviet Far Eastern Fighters**



Source: Defence of Japan, 1987

**Diagram 5 Changes in Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces**



Source: Defence of Japan, 1987


As for navel forces, about 840 ships with a total displacement of 1.85 million tons out of the Soviet Navy's total strength, which amounts to about 2,980 ships with a total displacement of 7.18 million tons, are under the flag of the Pacific Fleet, the Soviet Union's largest. The 840 ships include about 95 principal surface vessels and about 140 submarines (75 of them being nuclear-powered). The Pacific Fleet has been steadily reinforced for the last two decades both in number and tonnage (See Diagram 5). It has been qualitatively modernized through a reinforcement of large-sized sophisticated vessels like the Delta III-class SSBN and other nuclear-powered submarines, the Kiev-class aircraft carrier and the Kara-class missile cruisers (See Diagram 6).

There are two other remarkable Soviet military developments in the Asia-Pacific region as well. The Soviet Union has increased its naval and airpower in the Western Pacific using Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam and the Soviet Union has deployed its ground troops on Kunashiri Island, Etorofu island and Shikotan island, as well as in parts of the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japan territory. This force is estimated to be division size. The force assets consist of the tanks, armored APCs, various artillery weapons, anti-aircraft missiles and MI-24 Hind armed helicopters that are normally possessed by their divisions, and 130 mm canons, which usually are not provided in their division. In addition, there are about 40 MiG-23 Flogger fighters at Tennei airstrip on Etorofu island.<sup>9</sup>

**Diagram 6 Changes in Modernization of Soviet Far Eastern Vessels**

**(1) Missile Equipment for Major Surface Combat Vessels**

**(2) Nuclearization of Submarines**



SOURCE: Defense of Japan, 1987

There are reasons why the Soviet Union has redeployed its ground troops in the Northern territories. The sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan have become very important from its strategic viewpoint. The Soviet advance toward Japan is prompted by a desire to secure the sea of Okhotsk from which Soviet submarines can launch ballistic missiles against the continental United States.<sup>10</sup>

The major base of Vladivostok is located only 30 minutes flight time from Japanese air bases. It is a major part of the deployment of naval battleships and nuclear-armed submarines.

There are only two practical exits from the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan for these ships and submarines: the Korean Strait between Korea and Japan's Kyushu, and through the Kurile Island chain, which separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. The exits from the Sea of Japan into the Sea of Okhotsk are through the Soya Strait between Japan's Hokkaido and Sakhalin Island in the south and in the north between Sakhalin and mainland USSR.

Access to the Pacific through the Kurile chain would be made extremely complicated for the Soviet Union were the Northern Territories to revert to Japan. From a political viewpoint, the deployment seems to be aimed partly

forcing upon Japan the established fact of the illegal occupation of the Northern Territories.<sup>11</sup>

At the same time that the USSR has been increasing its power in the Far East, Soviet military aircraft have moved and maneuvered more actively around Japan. Recently Soviet bomber aircraft and patrol aircraft flew between the USSR main land and the East China Sea and Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay through North Korean airspace. In addition, since 1982 TU-22M Backfire bomber aircrafts have flown southward over the Sea of Japan a few times. Furthermore, Soviet aircraft invaded Japanese airspace off Rebun island, Hokkaido, in February 1986. Some of the Soviet aircraft that have flown very close to Japan are suspected of having been engaged in attack training against JASDF radar sites.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the following fact is still vivid in the memory of the Japanese people. In December 1987, a TU-95 Bear bomber aircraft invaded Japanese airspace between Kyusu and Okinawa.<sup>13</sup>

#### E. BACKGROUND OF THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPANSION

G. Paul Holman mentions that the Soviet Military buildup was not initiated by Brezhnev. On the contrary the current strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is the direct and inevitable results of the socio-economic



priorities that Vladimir Lenin sketched and Josef Stalin built irrevocably into the Soviet system.<sup>14</sup>

The several purposes behind the Soviet military expansion have been analyzed as follows: to enhance deterrence; to have political results; to inspire a more respectful and conciliatory attitude toward the Soviets on the part of the United States and other Western powers; and to favorably affect the struggle for influence in the third world Soviet military power is not the result of an action-reaction phenomenon or an exaggeration of the Tsarist military legacy but the product of definite and relatively specific political goals.<sup>15</sup>

Harry Gelman of the Rand Corporation has talked about the background of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East:

Over the last few years, the buildup of Soviet military strength in the Far East has emerged from purely regional significance to become one of the important factors in the world distribution of forces. This buildup has evolved from relatively simple beginnings to more and more complex purposes. It now serves not only to assert the Soviet version of border with China and Japan but also to promote a steadily widening circle of Soviet geopolitical interests elsewhere. The military capabilities that are methodically growing in Northeast Asia are increasingly linked, both by circumstance and design with Soviet hopes and opportunities to the South and Southwest.<sup>16</sup>

In retrospect, we can point out some reasons for

the Soviet military buildup in East Asia. It was directed against China in the mid-1960s. Through the 1970s, Soviet leaders were aware of and learned the emergency of military cooperation as well as economic cooperation between the United States, China, and Japan and they gave a heightened priority to military capabilities in East Asia and increased both their qualitative and their quantitative capabilities to confront the United States, China and Japan.<sup>17</sup>

### III. THE CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING WHAT JAPAN DOES MILITARILY TO RESPOND

#### A. INTRODUCTION

In order to ensure the peace and security of Japan and protect it from foreign invasion, it is necessary to advance a positive diplomacy to consolidate a stable international environment, and to establish a defense system to deter any aggression, or in the case of aggression actually taking place, to eliminate it.

Japan is at present making an effort to enhance its defense capabilities with the aim of attaining the level of defense capabilities stipulated in the "National Defense Program Outline" at the earliest possible date in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and basic defense policy.

However, there are some differences between the Japanese defense buildup and those in other countries. These should be considered when we talk about Japanese defense capability or the Japanese people's attitude toward defense.

Therefore, this chapter will analyze Japan's national security policy; constitutional constraints; defense budget; and the U.S.-Japan security arrangements which Japan depends on so much not only in a military but also in an economic sense.

## B. JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Japan's basic national security objective, just as that of the United States, is to preserve Japan as a free nation at peace with its fundamental institutions and values intact. Japan's post war defense and Security policies have been shaped by a mixture of factors: its isolated geographical position, its vulnerability to attack, its devastating defeat in WWII and the subsequent American occupation, the pacifist sentiments and "nuclear allergy" of its people, the constitutional prohibition renouncing war as a right of the Japanese nation, and the heavy Japanese dependence upon foreign markets and resources. Beneath the entire post war Japanese approach to security has been a fear of being drawn into a conflict outside Japan.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Japan seeks to preserve the peace and security of Japan and to protect it from possible armed invasion through a comprehensive security policy which combines diplomatic, economic, and military elements.

### \*Positive and Peaceful Diplomacy

Positive and peaceful diplomacy is the top priority of Japan's national security. In order to keep the peace and security of Japan by preventing aggression in advance,

it is necessary first and foremost to make efforts to promote international cooperation and global peace. For this purpose, it is necessary to prevent any conflict or friction and resolve problems with other countries of the world in a wide range of areas, including political and economic relations, by means of diplomatic and other endeavors. At the same time, it is also necessary to deepen mutual understanding and establish friendly relations with these countries. In particular, it is especially imperative for Japan to maintain diplomatic relations with the nations which are directly concerned with Japan's security.<sup>2</sup>

'Development and Maintenance of Moderate and High  
Qualitative Defense Capability

In order to preserve the peace and security of Japan, positive diplomacy is indispensable for the stability of the nation's political, economic and social conditions, but it is true that these steps alone could hardly prevent or discourage an attempt to launch attacks on this country. Japan must be prepared to defend herself against overt, hostile military action by a foreign power. There is a need for Japan to be prepared with self-defense measures to deter any aggression, or in the case of aggression actually taking place, to eliminate it. For this purpose,

Japan is striving to sustain its security by maintaining moderate and high quality defense capabilities and holding fast to the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.<sup>3</sup>

Japan adopted the "Basic Policy for National Defense" in May 1957. This cited as the basis of national security, first, the promotion of international cooperation and efforts for peace and the establishment of the foundation of security through stabilization of domestic affairs and the gradual improvement of an effective defense capability and the U.S.-Japan security arrangements.<sup>4</sup>

In October 1976, Japan also developed the "National Defense Program outline" (NDPO). The basic concept of the NDPO was the establishment of a small but flexible force capable of coping on its own with a variety of contingencies up to the point of "limited and small-scale aggression." Beyond that, situations would require a Japanese holding action until U.S. military help arrived. It was thought that such a force, having standardized and well balanced structures backed by suitable logistic support systems, would be expanded, as necessary, to meet larger defense needs and requirements. The Standard Defense Force Concept emphasized primarily the qualitative improvement of weapons systems and equipment but did not change substantively the overall force structure of the Self

Defense Force.<sup>5</sup>

Japan has a firm policy about nuclear weapons called "three non-nuclear principles." It means "not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan."<sup>6</sup> Although there are major U.S. Air Force bases at Misawa and Kadena and a U.S. naval base at Yokosuka in Japan, the Japanese people believe that there are not nuclear weapons on these bases. The United States is supposed, according to the terms of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, to inform Japan when it intends to introduce such weapons, and Japan has not been so informed thus far.

#### C. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

At the end of WWII all of Japan's military forces were demobilized as one of the conditions of surrender. The present-day Self Defense Force grew out of a National Police Reserve, which was set up to maintain the peace in 1950 and then reorganized as the Peace Preservation Corps in 1952. Today's Force came into existence in 1954.<sup>7</sup>

The present Japanese Constitution, promulgated in 1947, renounces the sovereign right of the state to use war as a means of settling international disputes. This does not mean, however, that the people of Japan have

renounced the right of the state to defend itself.<sup>8</sup> As long as the right of self-defense cannot be denied, Japan remains firm in the view that the constitution does not prohibit the maintenance of the minimum level of armed strength necessary to exercise the right of self-defense. Acting in accordance with a defense policy exclusively defensive in nature, Japan has maintained armed self-defense forces and taken steps to improve its capabilities and to ensure its efficient management.

The Japanese Government holds to the following views regarding the Constitution's Article 9, which prescribes the renunciation of war:

- \*The self-defense capability permitted to Japan within the constitutional limitations must be the minimum necessary for self-defense. Japan cannot have weapon systems which are used exclusively for the destruction of neighboring countries, such as ICBMs and long-range strategies bombers.
- \*The execution of the self-defense right is constrained by three necessary conditions: a sudden and unjustifiable aggression against Japan; no appropriate measures to cope with this aggression other than resort to the right of self-defense; and the use of armed strength should be confined to the necessary minimum.<sup>9</sup>



#### D. DEFENSE BUDGET

In September 1985, a new "Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 1986-1990)" was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet. This was designed to accelerate the attainment of the force level that the NDPO had stipulated be reached by the mid-1990s. In order to meet the increasing threat, Japan should review the NDPO in the light of subsequent international developments and, based upon the division of roles and missions concept, strive to achieve the NDPO's force levels as quickly as possible.

One of the most significant constraints on the improvements of Japanese defense capability has been the 1 percent of GNP ceiling which was adopted in 1976.<sup>10</sup> But the Japanese defense budget had 1.004 percent of GNP in JFY 1987, which exceeded the 1 percent limit of GNP for the first time. The Japan could point out a rise to 1.013% in JFY 1988 and 1.006% in JFY 1989.<sup>11</sup>

The Japanese government has thus decided on a new policy. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 1986-1990)," decided by the Cabinet on September 18, 1985, was formulated under the basic policies mentioned before. The defense expenditures of each fiscal year in the period which the Program covered were to be decided within the scope of

the required expenses for implementation of the Program as estimated therein.<sup>12</sup>

Most Japanese believe that Japan's defense expenditure is sufficient or greater than it should be: therefore, they hold that it should be limited to about 1 percent of GNP.<sup>13</sup> The real test of Japan's level of defense and of its capabilities, however, is not how much defense spending has increased but how well the SDF can defend Japan. Japan's defense budget should not be determined as a percentage of the whole national budget or a percentage of GNP; it should be determined in accordance with strategic requirements and assessments to meet the threat and with Japan's international responsibility as a member of the Western community and an ally of the United States.

#### E. JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Most Japanese leaders and people believe that the United States is the most important ally in the world and that Japan cannot survive without the United States. Therefore, Japan's policy toward the United States flows out of this perception.

In May 1981, then Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki agreed with President Reagan on a joint communique using the next word "alliance" for the first time in Japan's diplomatic

history. The communique said that "the president and the Prime Minister, recognizing that 'alliance' between the U.S. and Japan is built upon the shared values of democracy and liberty, reaffirmed their solidarity, friendship and mutual trust." Subsequently, another prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone also held that "Maintaining unshakable trust and developing the alliance with the U.S. is most important not only for relations between Japan and the United States but also for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world."<sup>14</sup>

The Japan-U.S. security arrangements constitute a basis of Japan's defense and are an indispensable element of its national security. In order to assure its own peace and independence, Japan should establish an unassailable defense posture capable of deterring any conceivable situation from the use of conventional arms to military coercion and intimidation. However, it is impossible for Japan to set up such a defense structure on its own. Japan depends on the security arrangements with the United States for the defense capability which it lacks, such as a deterrent power against nuclear threats and a counter-attack capability against a large-scale invasion with conventional weapons.<sup>15</sup>

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between

Japan and the United States of America signed on June 23, 1960 mentioned clearly what the U.S.-Japan common goal is. It says, that Japan and the United States of America desire "to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them" and "to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law," and that they desire further "to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries..." More important, it states that they consider "that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East."<sup>16</sup> U.S.-Japan Security cooperation helps the United States counter Soviet military strength in East Asia and helps maintain the global balance of power.<sup>17</sup>

Since 1969, however, when the Nixon Doctrine was articulated, Japan has been assigned a leading position under the doctrinal postulates of "burden sharing" and "self-reliance."<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, economic friction has increased because of an increased trade imbalance between Japan and the United States.

Concurrently, there have been some remarkable changes in the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region. These include the withdrawal from Vietnam; the U.S.

diplomatic opening to China; the signing of the peace treaty between China and Japan; the energy crisis; the unrelenting increase of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces and the USSR's military presence in the region, especially the deployment of Soviet ground and air forces onto the Northern Territories; Soviet military intervention in and withdrawal from Afghanistan; and the conclusion of the INF treaty. Such circumstances have encouraged Japan to be aware of the reality of the threat and to improve its defense capability, but they have also caused serious friction between the United States and Japan on defense as well as economics. American frustration with Japan has escalated, and today it has reached a level that threatens to undermine the U.S.-Japanese relationship. The current disputes over trade and defense could erode the trust and confidence necessary for the maintenance of U.S.-Japan cooperation, which is essential for the peace and stability of Asia.<sup>19</sup>

Both countries have various kinds of conferences, meetings and negotiations with each other. Through these opportunities, it is very important that they try to review and confirm their common goals based on their long-range interests. The United States and Japan share a number of interests in the Asia-Pacific region. These can be

summarized as follows:

- \*preservation of peace and stability in the region
- \*the establishment of the political and economic conditions that will promote the orderly development of the many smaller countries in this region; and
- \*an abiding concern with freedom of the seas and air and access to foreign markets and resources.<sup>20</sup>

#### IV. PRESENT STATUS AND PROBLEMS OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCE

##### A. INTRODUCTION

Former CINCPAC Admiral Lang mentioned in his address to the U.S. Naval War College in November, 1984: "The Self Defense Force does not have enough combat capabilities in waging a modern war: the SDF maintains high skill and tactics but in specific fields; the sustainability of the SDF is less than a week; the coemployment of the most sophisticated and old fashion weapon systems will be hazardous for a coordinated and effective operation; decision making often takes too long."<sup>1</sup>

Even if this statement is overly severe, it points out the real weak points of the SDF and suggests to Japan to take appropriate action to improve the combat capabilities of the SDF. This chapter will focus, especially the forces in the Air Self Defense Force, on how the ASDF, might build up its capabilities, what the ASDF present status is, and what kind of difficulties the ASDF has.

##### B. BUILDUP OF AN EFFICIENT DEFENSE FORCE

The Japanese government adopted a new defense program, "The Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 1986-1990)," instead

of "59 Chugyo" (The 1984 Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate) in September 1985. This program, aimed at attaining the force level stipulated in the National Defense Program Outline, is now improving Japan's defense capability as a result of the steady implementation of the program.<sup>2</sup>

The Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 1986-1990) focused on enhancing the following capabilities of the SDF:

- \*Improving the air defense capability of the main islands by improving and modernizing interceptors, surface-to-air guided missiles, etc.
- \*Improving the capability to protect sea lines of communication by increasing and modernizing vessels, anti-submarine aircraft, etc.
- \*Improving the capability to counter an invasion landing by modernizing divisions, diversifying formations of divisions and strengthening such capability so as to destroy invading forces in the outer seas and coastal waters.
- \*Improving the defense capabilities with a proper balance between frontal equipment and logistic support elements. Especially
  - to improve intelligence, reconnaissance, and command and communication capability.
  - to enhance sustainability and combat readiness as well as to reduce vulnerability.
  - to promote technological research and development.
  - to improve education and training conditions.
  - to improve living conditions for personnel.
- \*Seeking the utmost efficiency and rationalization in respect of both improvement and operation of the defense forces.<sup>3</sup>

This program seems to take fully into account American critiques of the capabilities of the SDF. In 1989, this program is in its crucial fourth year. The pace of defense efforts accepted in the JFY 1989 Defense budget is more



than 5% in real terms, as in the previous year.

Japan this year has achieved about 21 percent of the progress rate required for fulfillment of the Program, as compared with about 18 percent in JFY 1986, about 19 percent in JFY 1987, and about 20 percent in JFY 1988 (See Diagram 7).<sup>4</sup> If it maintains this evenly accelerated pace in the next year as well, it will be able to attain the targets of the Mid-Term Defense Program. There is no difference between the United States and Japan over the force levels required for the SDF to perform its share of roles and missions. Japan is going to adopt a Program (1991-1995) in this year, and it intends to attain the force level stipulated in the NDPO as quickly as possible and to seek a mutually agreeable force level based upon a common strategy.

With respect to air defense, Japan plans to replace the F-1 jet fighter with the so called FS-X. The latter, according to the agreement reached between the United States and Japan, will be codeveloped. This deal, worked out by U.S. and Japanese officials after strenuous negotiations, is good for the United States, good for American industry, and good for Japanese and Western security. The technology transfer arrangements - in both U.S. and Japan - and work share are fair, equitable and unprecedented and will help

# Diagram 7 Progress of Mid-Term Defense Program

## Major Equipment

	Item	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	Quantity to be procured under Mid-Term Program
GSDF	Tank (Note)	56	52	52	56	246
	Firearms	68	61	49	49	277
	Armored personnel carrier	45	61	60	71	310
	Anti-tank helicopter (AH-1S)	8	8	8	9	43
	Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	4	4	5	5	24
	Surface to air guided missile (improved HAWK)	0.5 group	1 group	1 group	1 group	4.5 groups
MSDF	Destroyer	3		2	2	9
	Submarine	1	1	1	1	5
	Fixed-wing anti-submarine patrol aircraft	10	9	9	10	50
	Anti-submarine helicopter (Note)	13	17	12	12	66
	Mine-sweeping helicopter (MH-53E)	4		2	4	12
ASDF	Fighter-interceptor (F-15)	12	12	12	11	63
	Transport aircraft (C-130H)	2		3	2	7
	Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	3	2	3	2	12
	Medium training aircraft (T-4)	12	20	20	20	93
	SAM (Patriot)	1 group	1 group	1 group	1 group	5 groups

Note: New type tank and new anti-submarine helicopter included, respectively.

## Expenditure

Item	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	Mid-Term Program
Defense related expenditure	About 18%	About 19%	About 20%	About 21%	About ¥18.4 trillion (at prices in 1985)

← 78% →

advance U.S.-Japanese defense and industrial cooperation.<sup>5</sup>

Other equipment will be purchased, with particular importance attached to improving air defense capability, air transportation capability, and so on. Remodeling of the F-4EJs will be undertaken to prolong their lives because of the relative shortage of capability that they provide.<sup>6</sup>

#### C. PRESENT STATE OF AIR DEFENSE OPERATION

U.S. Representative Stephen Solarz has criticized the capability of the ASDF in several respects. Japan's military forces he has said, cannot contribute substantially to the defense of their own territory against my realistic threat. The Air Self Defense Force lacks the number of planes needed to counter even a moderate-sized attack. Unprotected radar sites and air bases and inadequate repair facilities would force Japanese planes out of action in a few days. All of the Japanese self defense forces suffer from shortages of ammunition and spare parts and from poor logistics. Command and control capabilities are seriously inadequate. Reserve units and mobilization procedures virtually do not exist.<sup>7</sup>

These comments should come as no surprise, because all countries except the United States and the Soviet Union lack adequate military capabilities. It is important,

however, to know what capabilities we have and do not have, in particular what capabilities we lack.

## 2. Significance of Air Defense Operation

In the case of a direct invasion of Japan, aircraft would probably attack the country first because of geographical characteristics and the nature of a modern combat with technologically advanced equipment. The attack would be repeated by aircraft as long as combat on land went on. Accordingly, air defense capability will have a great influence on the operations to be carried out. Therefore, effective air defense operations are very essential for the defense of Japan.

The air defense of Japan has two parts in terms of purpose. The first is to defend important political, economic, and defense areas of the nation. The Air Self Defense Force will be in charge of this mission. The second is to defend each base and unit of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. The Air defense operation, in this case, will be achieved by the respective forces.<sup>8</sup>

Overall air defense calls for intercepting the invading aircraft outside Japanese territory as far as circumstances and conditions permit. It also aims at attacking the invading aircraft before they attack weak points and areas of this land, protecting our land and nation from damage,

maintaining the capability of executing the defense operations without giving the enemy aircraft tactical advantage, forcing enemy aircraft to suffer a heavy loss whenever they invade Japan and thereby making it difficult to continue the air attack on Japan.

On the other hand, the defense of the SDF bases from air raids means to keep up capabilities to execute defense operations. Together with the overall defense, the air defense of the SDF bases and units will contribute to an increase in the effectiveness of air defense operations by shooting down or damaging many enemy aircraft.

### 3. Outline of Air Defense Operation

The strategy for the overall air defense operation is just the same as that for the United States and other countries. It involves detection, identification, interception, and destruction.

Detection and identification: Aircraft warning and control units detect and identify intruding aircraft with radar and early-warning aircraft. At the same time, they conduct interception control and assign attacking targets to fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

Interception and destruction: Interceptor-fighter units conduct air combat in extensive, spacious areas with their excellent mobility. Surface-to-air missile units,

with their speedy movement and action, are suitable particularly for the air defense of important places.<sup>9</sup>

As mentioned before, Japan in 1976 developed. The basic concept of the NDPO was the establishment of a small but flexible force capable of coping on its own with a variety of contingencies up to the point of "limited and small-scale aggression." Beyond that, however, situations would require a Japanese holding action until U.S. military help arrived.<sup>10</sup>

This means, that, under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japanese Air defense strategy cannot be considered on its own, but must be associated with a common strategy established through close coordination and consultation with the United States. Thus to prepare for air defense operation, Japan's Air Defense Force should train very hard not only on its own but also with the USAF.

a. Present Air Defense Capability

In recent years, the speed, maneuverability, range, and capability of intrusion at ultra-high or ultra-low altitudes of military airplanes has improved greatly. Furthermore, the adoption of advanced electronic equipment and missiles on board with lower firing range and improved guiding performance has greatly enhanced their striking

ability. In light of such developments, of the international security framework, and of the military situation around Japan, Japan should strive to build up its equipment and facilities, as well as to modernize them in order to cope with the enemy effectively.

b. Warning and Control System

Twenty-eight radar sites are scattered across Japan to continually survey almost the whole air space over Japanese territory. In addition, E-2C early-warning aircraft are deployed to keep an eye on intruding aircraft flying into Japan at lower altitudes and invisible to ground-based radar. In 1988, the ASDF finished the BADGE System, which will enhance aircraft identification.

c. Interceptor Fighter

The ASDF is required to have interceptor-fighters with excellent performance and equipment so that they can counter highly advanced intruding aircraft under any natural condition during the day or night. Because Japan is a long and narrow archipelago country with four seasons and a full variety of weather and climate, the area that must be covered for defense is wide. In addition, Japan maintains an "exclusively defensive" defense policy.

For these reasons, the ASDF maintains an increasing number of F-15s, which will be able to intercept intruding

aircraft. At present, the JASDF maintains 5 F-15s squadrons, 5 F-4EJ squadrons, and 3 F-1 squadrons. A gradual replacement of the F-4EJ with the F-15 is under way for qualitative enhancement of aircraft, for the F-4EJ is relatively insufficient in combat capability when compared to the Soviet aircraft now deployed at the USSR's Far Eastern bases. The ASDF will be deploying F-15 fighters to the Sixth SQ this year, and a total of 7 SQs will be organized by JFY 1992.

d. Surface-to-Air-Missiles

As for surface-to-air missiles (SAM), the ASDF has Nike-J missiles, and the GSDF possesses Hawk missiles. However, the Nike-J cannot effectively counter new types of threats because of its lack of adequate ECCM capability and its inability to track multiple targets. Therefore, the ASDF had decided to replace the Nike system with a new SAM, the Patriot system. The SAM air defense capability will be greatly improved as this replacement progresses. At the same time, the gradual introduction of improved Hawk missiles is under way in order to increase its aiming-guiding and electronic-warfare capabilities.

D. PROBLEMS OF THE AIR SELF DEFENSE FORCE

1. Over What Area Should the ASDF Be in Charge



If the Japan-U.S. alliance is based on a mutual assessment that each country is of a vital interest to the other, why should Japan expect the United States to provide the overwhelming portion of naval and air power in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia while Japan continues to provide only for "self-defense?"<sup>11</sup> Even if Japan did nothing for its own defense of course Japan would still be important to the United States, but the more Japan does militarily, the greater its importance to the United States.<sup>12</sup>

The growth of Soviet military power and of the Soviet military presence around Japan creates anxieties there. But with limited resources and faced with growing demands in the middle East and elsewhere, the United States may be tempted to press Japan beyond what the Japanese political situation can tolerate to step up dramatically its military contributions. Such eagerness to push Japan into assuming a larger share of the common defense could in turn encourage the Japanese to review, reluctantly, their national strategy.<sup>13</sup>

However, the United States agrees that Japan should not become a military giant and looks to Japan to provide for conventional, anti-invasion, air and sea-lane defense within 1,000 miles. Japan is best served if it can provide

a credible and flexible self defense.<sup>14</sup>

At present, Japan does not have an effective air defense capability to protect the sea lane even though Japan depends on imports that pass through these sea lanes for over 90 percent of its raw material and its energy. Again, surrounded by the sea, Japan is a small country in terms of area with about a 120 million people and heavily dependent on overseas countries for most of its natural resources, energy and food needs. In order to maintain Japan's existence and development, it is essential for Japan to protect its sea transportation from obstruction. The protection of sea transportation both at sea level and in the air is also very important from the viewpoint of maintaining was sustainability and securing the bases for reinforcement by the U.S. Forces.<sup>15</sup>

## 2. How to Cope with the Increasing New Air Threats

As military technology has advanced, aircraft performance capabilities such as speed, range, and payload have been improved, and missiles with longer ranges have emerged. The mode of attack by aircraft and missiles has also changed considerably. As a result, aircraft have expanded their sphere of activities to the air space over the sea far away from their ground base. In addition,

long-range missiles have the ability to attack radar sites and airfields from the air space over the outer seas, and ships beyond the effective range of anti-air missiles carried by surface ships.

These developments have greatly complicated Japan's self-defense. It had been considered possible that Japan could provide air defense of its home land, including defense of strategic areas and defense bases or facilities, against various air threats over Japanese territory. However, in view of current trends in air threats, it has become very difficult, with conventional means alone, to effectively deal with aircraft or missiles attacking defense bases or facilities from the outer seas. This situation raises the question of how to cope with such new air threats.

#### CONCLUSION

Japan has tried to build up his defense capability in the past decade. However Japan does not have an effective air defense capability to protect the sea lane even though 120 million people heavily depends on overseas countries for most of its natural resources energy and foods.

Especially, Japan does not have the way to cope with

long-range missiles which have the ability to attack radar sites, and airfields from the air space over the outer seas and ships.

Japan should improve suitable defense capability to deter and to cope with real threat.

## V. MATTERS OF FUTURE CHALLENGE

### A. INTRODUCTION

Japan is an archipelago that lies close to the eastern part of the Asian continent and stretches out to the Pacific Ocean in a bow shape. It is situated in a region marked by geographical diversity, which includes the Soviet continent, the Chinese continent, and the Kamchatka and Korean peninsulas. Many large and small islands including Japan, the sea of Japan, the sea of Okhotsk and other seas are enclosed by the lands and straits leading to the Pacific Ocean from these seas.

Thus, Japan forms a part of the most vital route of the region to the Pacific Ocean from the Asian continent, through the sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and other sea areas. Because of this unique geographical position, this country provides an essential link between the Asian continent and the Pacific Ocean.

This geographical advantage, combined with its strong economic and technological power, puts Japan in a position of great strategic importance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship of military confrontation across the Pacific Ocean. The Soviet Union is believed to be strongly interested in expanding its influence in the Pacific region. This is apparent from the military buildup in the Far East

and the stepped-up movements of Soviet ships and aircraft in the Pacific and South China Sea regions.

Japan can never escape from these facts. Therefore, Japan should look at these facts objectively making every effort to enable its 120 million people to survive and prosper. This chapter will offer some recommendations that Japan and Air Self Defense force should adopt in such a light: Japan should make an effort to be a real equal partner to the United States. Japan should reconsider its nuclear policy. Japan should endeavor to improve the English capability of its personnel.

#### B. JAPAN SHOULD TRY TO BE REAL EQUAL PARTNERS TO THE UNITED STATES

As mentioned in Chapter III, the United States is the most important political, economic and military ally in the world, and Japan cannot survive without the United States. Most Japanese leaders and people accept this proposition.

The United States and Japan also have a common goal, however, to preserve peace and prosperity not only in the two countries but in the world. Both countries should establish compatible strategies that will constitute a firm basis for alliance in the next decade.<sup>1</sup> Each partner should have an equal share in each sphere according to

its abilities.

In the past, Japan has made every effort to become a real equal partner; moreover, Japan has supported U.S. policies which it believed promoted world peace and stability, unlike some of America's. West European allies, for example, Japan boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics and adopted sanctions against the Soviet Union following the latter's invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>

However, Japan has confronted various domestic constraints which have impeded the pursuit of a closer and more effective alliance. These have included the three non-nuclear principles, GNP-1-%-Defense budget policy, the Constitutional constraints issue, and prohibition of dispatching military forces to foreign territory, etc. Concurring the Constitution, the Japanese government has interpreted its Constitution flexibility, but it is becoming very difficult to gain full support from the United States even so.

The current international environment--especially, as analyzed earlier, the rapid increase of Soviet military buildup around Japan--suggests to Japan that it must take additional reasonable and appropriate actions as a real equal partner. In order to become an equal partner, Japan should first, carry on a more lively discussion in public

about defense issues. This should cover the actual conditions of the threat, the world military structure, the significance of Self Defense Forces, alternative decision-making on the defense budget, etc. Such discussion would help to alter the way of thinking that national security and defense issues are the province for members of the Diet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency. It is very important as well that members of the Diet and all government officials, not only those in the MOP and JDA but also other ministries and agencies too, should understand the correct perception about the National Security and defense.

For Japan to become an equal partner of course, the United States must be prepared to accept Japan as a more equal partner. The United States could, for example, defer on some Asian political and economical issues where Japanese interests are much more directly involved than are America's.<sup>3</sup>

#### C. JAPAN SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS NUCLEAR POLICY

Unlike the United States and other nuclear states, Japan does not possess any nuclear weapons. However, Japan has to survive a nuclear war. Therefore, Japan relies on the United State to deter a nuclear threat to Japan.



On the other hand, as mentioned in Chapter III, Japan has the "three non-nuclear principles:" not possessing, not manufacturing, or not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in June 1976 and placed itself under an obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

Japan's land area is one twenty-fifth that of the United States, and residential land accounts for only 3 percent of all land. The population is greatest along the Pacific seaboard, where the weather is mild and the transportation and industrial facilities are most highly developed. In fact, approximately 70 percent of the nation's people live on the strip of coastal plain between Tokyo and the Northern part of Kyush.<sup>5</sup>

Needless to say, this fact shows that Japan is in a disadvantageous position with regard to nuclear attack. Even Japan's top heavy industries, which are its main defense industries, such as Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji, do not have any shelter or anti-nuclear measures. There are no industries in Japan such as Lockheed (Marietta) Co. whose entire factory basement is used for shelter.

It is very regrettable that not only civilians but also government officials do not take into account anti-

nuclear measures, in spite of the fact that Japan was the first and last nuclear victim. We understand that a deterrent capability refers to the ability to damage the enemy; on the other hand, a defense capability means the ability to diminish our damage.

It is reasonable to possess a nuclear weapon, if we can inflict the same or greater damage on the enemy as the damage which Japan would suffer if attacked by a nuclear weapon. However, as I mentioned before, there are many disadvantages to a nuclear attack on Japan, and there are no counter measures against any nuclear weapon. Therefore, Japan should make every effort to build up high credibility in the Japan-U.S. security arrangement and should remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as Japan has done so far. Japan should not possess any nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, I would suggest change in the last of Japan's three non-nuclear principles, "not allowing introductions to Japan." Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, revealed that U.S. ships have for years been carrying nuclear weapons into Japanese ports and argued that Japan's attitude on the nuclear issue was unrealistic.<sup>6</sup> In fact, though the Japanese found Reischauer's announcement shocking, most Japanese people do not believe that U.S. naval ships will offload nuclear

weapons prior to paying port calls, and they are ready to allow U.S. naval ships with nuclear weapons to make port calls without doing so. Consequently, Japan should consider returning to the original interpretation of the last of its three principles of Japan wants to stand firm against such Soviet nuclear blackmail, it should give the United States the option of bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese waters and naval ports for transit purposes, as long as the Japanese government retains the right to be consulted in advance by Washington on U.S. operations originating in Japan.<sup>7</sup>

The U.S. and Japanese governments have never officially discussed the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and the linkage between Japan's defense forces and the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Rather, both countries seem to have avoided talking about this controversial issue internationally. However, in order to cope with the Soviet nuclear threat to both countries, both countries should not avoid such a discussion. The two countries should establish a joint study commission to achieve this objective.

#### D. IMPROVED AIR DEFENSE

As explained before, in order to provide protection

against air threats, Japan has sought to improve its defense capabilities by maintaining aircraft control warning units and acquiring various types of equipment, such as interceptors, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-air guns, and anti-air missiles and guns on vessels. Despite the efforts to improve defense capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively, however, it is indispensable to identify deficiencies in air defense. Two areas require attention here: air defense at sea and anti-missile capability. As already pointed out, Japan is entirely surrounded by sea, and it imports almost all of its necessary resources from other countries. Therefore, air defense is indispensable to affording security from air attack by aircraft and missiles not only to our people on land, defense bases such as radar sites and airfields, and ground units, but also to ships at sea which transport raw material, ground units, and goods necessary for the survival of Japan.

Air defense of the homeland, including defense of strategic areas and defense bases or facilities, has been considered possible mainly by intercepting air threats over Japanese territory. However, in view of current trends in air threats, it has become difficult, by conventional means alone, to effectively deal with aircraft or missiles

attacking defense bases or facilities from the outer seas.<sup>8</sup> As a result, Japan must decide how to cope with such attacks.

It has also become difficult, with present equipment only, to cope particularly with anti-ship missiles or aircraft with them at sea. Therefore, it has become necessary to consider measures to respond to such threats.

One feasible answer is to deploy and employ AWACS and aerial tankers. A combination of the F-15 interceptor, the AWACS and their aerial tanker would be the best operational concept. These three systems together can contribute not only to air defense of Japan's main islands but also to the defense of the sea lines of communication. However, in acquiring AWACS and aerial tankers, Japan should clearly explain their relationship to its exclusive defense policy, for they would give Japan a capability to attack other countries.

Soviet cruise missile technology is believed to be almost as sophisticated as that of the United States. Soviet cruise missiles are now equipped with nuclear warheads, but like the U.S. Tomahawk, they could be replaced with conventional munitions. Taking into account the geographic characteristics of Japan, the attack by cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads would seem to

be one of the more effective operations to attack Japan. Most military facilities in Japan are unprotected. Detection and interceptions of cruise missiles are very difficult with present Japanese air defense systems. In addition to the physical damage from a cruise-missile attack against Japan, the psychological impact would be far beyond estimation. An anti-cruise missile capability is something that Japan should consider and develop as quickly as possible.

#### D. IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS (ENGLISH)

There are many differences between the United States and Japan: in their races and historical development, in cultural patterns and institutional infrastructures, in their policy and decision making process, in their way of thinking and communicating, in natural resources, in geopolitical location and size, and in the homogeneity of the Japanese people compared to the heterogeneity of the American people.<sup>9</sup> These differences too often place the United States and Japan on opposite sides, threaten their mutual trust, and make issues much harder to resolve.

Perhaps the only way for both countries to overcome their differences is to further their mutual understanding by taking advantage of common goals and interests. The

importance of furthering mutual understanding cannot be emphasized too much.

I strongly stress that successful communication is the most important factor in the conduct of Japan joint/combined operation for the defense of Japan. The Air Self Defense Force should strive to train its personnel to improve its communication capability with U.S. Forces. Unlike Nato and Korea, Japan does not have a joint/combined headquarters with U.S. forces. In an actual conflict, the Air Self Defense Force and USAF, in close cooperation, would take action through their respective command-and-control channels. Therefore to conduct U.S.-Japan combined operation successfully, close and accurate communication is needed between the two forces at every level.

Japanese and English differ greatly in terms of pronunciation, and sentence structures are entirely different. Even if the Japanese study, English is very hard, there may remain some difficulties in communication. However, if the Japanese don't do anything it is true that there will be not progressive communication.

Improving the English language capability of ASDF personnel is required. Japan should prepare the various U.S.-Japan coordination centers and train their members in peace-time.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The continued Soviet military buildup over the past two decades has created a very unstable situation in the Asian and Pacific region. The Soviet Union strives to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a sanctuary by improving its military power in the Far East and redeploying its ground and air forces on the Northern Islands.

We know the basic rule of Soviet behavior was laid down by Vladimir Lenin: "check with bayonets, if you encounter steel, you should withdraw; if you encounter mush, you should continue." Therefore, Japan should be ready and willing to take whatever action is required to be steel and cope with Soviet expansionism and protect its own interests.

Most Japanese understand that Japan relies upon the United States for both military security and benefits from the U.S. nuclear umbrella. U.S. bases in Japan are essential to America's military position and strategy in the Asia Pacific region.

At present, Japan is becoming a powerful country, especially in the economic area. Therefore, Japan should improve its air defense system to defend its own airspace. It should develop the naval and air capacity to protect its sea lanes in conjunction with U.S. forces in the region. It should even develop the capability to close the Tsushima,



Tsugaru and Soya straits to Soviet ships, which must pass through these waters to reach the Pacific Ocean and return to their home ports. Finally, Japan should continue the already announced steady and consecutive expansion of the Japanese air self-defense forces, with an emphasis on quality rather than quantity.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

- <sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Europe and Middle East and Asian Pacific Affairs. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.
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NOTES

CHAPTER III

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